This paper proposes generalized measures of wage dierentials that are not solely determined by \the average wage of the average person" but that depend on dierences across complete conditional wage distributions, thereby incorporating concerns about dierences in higher order moments. Both level and spread dierences are considered (while most existing approaches implicitly focus on levels only) and so considerations of risk aversion in the assessment of discrimination are included. This approach allows assessment of the existence of a risk-return trade o that could explain the persistence of wage gaps. However, application to survey data for Luxembourg suggests that risk-averse women are penalized twice: level is lower and spread tends to be higher in the (conditional) wage distributions of women.
Introduction
Typical statements about gender wage dierentials are such as \women are paid x percent less than men on average," sometimes followed by a qualication that \controlling for dierences in human capital endowments the remaining dierence is y percent." Such statements are almost always inferred from regression analysis a la Oaxaca-Blinder (Blinder, 1973 , Oaxaca, 1973 . They mean that the raw dierence in average wage is x percent and that the average wage for a woman with average human capital endowments is y percent below the average wage for a man with the same characteristics. 1 However, there is growing agreement that assessments of wage dierentials should go beyond comparisons of \the average wage of the average person." Recent studies have shown, for example, that mean dierences in pay is driven by greater dierences between men and women at the top of the wage distribution, an observation that has been interpreted as evidence of a`glass ceiling' impeding progress of women to highest paid jobs (see, e.g., Albrecht et al., 2003 , Arulampalam et al., 2007 . This paper proposes generalized measures of wage dierentials that are not solely determined by \the average wage of the average person" but that depend on dierences across complete conditional wage distributions, thereby incorporating concerns about dierences in higher order moments. Both level and spread dierences are considered and so considerations of risk aversion in the assessment of discrimination are included. In other words, I consider the possibility that differences in inequality and risk have an inuence when women compare their wages to what men with similar (observable) characteristics earn.
Of course, this is not the rst paper to consider full distribution dierences in measuring gender wage dierentials. Articulated critique of the Oaxaca-Blinder framework for discarding dierences in higher order moments goes back to Dolton and Makepeace (1985) . More recently, Fortin and Lemieux (1998) , Albrecht et al. (2003) , or Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) , for example, have implemented techniques to analyze complete distribution dierences by gender, separating out differences due to human capital endowments and dierential \returns" to human capital characteristics as in the Oaxaca-Blinder framework. The key distinction with these studies is that prejudice against women is captured here by comparing conditional wage distributions given human capital characteristics, rather than comparing unconditional distributions. The argument for capturing prejudice using conditional distributions, rather than from unconditional distribution dierences is that women are likely comparing themselves to observationally equivalent men when assessing wage dierentials. Whether a woman perceives prejudice compared to men is most likely based on her own experience or by looking at the situation of men and women with characteristics (human capital) similar to her. The measures are motivated by a notional framework in which women are assumed to have preferences over wage distributions. Women are considered prejudiced if they would prefer their wage to be drawn from the wage distribution of men according to some congurations of preferences.
2 Generalized measures of wage differentials
Notation and framework
Consider a population of N agents indexed i = 1, . . . , N. Each agent is a worker on a given labour market. Agents are of one of two possible (exogenously determined) types, male or female, denoted s i ∈ {m, f}. Each agent is endowed with a vector of characteristics x i ∈ Ξ reecting, e.g., her stock of human capital. Ξ is the set of all possible combinations of characteristics. Wages of type s agents with characteristics x are described by a random variable W 
Measures of wage differentials: Practice and critiques
A measure of wage dierentials between agents of the two types can be represented as a functional dened over H , that is, the distributions of characteristics in the two groups and the distributions of wage conditional on these characteristics in each group. The crudest measure is the dierence between the average wages for each type:
where E(·) denotes expectation:
The obvious limitation of ∆ 0 is that it does not take into account dierences in characteristics between the two groups. A common measure is therefore to compare the average wages conditionally on the average characteristics of one of the two groups. For example,
is the dierence between the average wage of women and the average wage among men having the average characteristics vector of women. ∆ 1 is also interpreted as the dierence between the average wage of women and the average wage they would get if their characteristics were`rewarded' as those of men, because
Therefore ∆ 1 can also be written
The wage dierential ∆ 1 is measured as the dierence in conditional wage expectations averaged over the characteristics distribution of women.
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Regression-based measures of wage dierential a la Oaxaca-Blinder (Blinder, 1973 , Oaxaca, 1973 are of this form after assuming a linear form for the conditional wage expectations
2 The choice of averaging over the characteristics distribution of women is open to debate. One might average over the characteristics distribution of men, or other distribution, and obtain an alternative measure. This form of`index number problem' is discussed in details in Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) . The present paper deliberately considers what Jenkins (1994) calls the`discrimination against women.' One of the two types of agents is taken as the sub-population of interest, here women. The wage dierential measure summarizes the`eect of being a woman rather than a man' among the sub-population of women. Intervention evaluation studies would call this a focus on the eect of \treatment on the treated".
In this case,
and one recognizes a classic regression-based measure.
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Wage dierential measures ∆ 0 and ∆ 0 rely exclusively on comparisons of mean wages and discard much information about higher order dierences between the wage distributions of the two types of agents. Dolton and Makepeace (1985) were among the rst to emphasize this limitation. It is now widely agreed upon that richer assessments are useful and a number of more elaborate techniques and summary measures have been developed and applied to study dierentials across groups (or distribution changes over time); see, inter alia, Juhn et al. (1993) , Jenkins (1994) , DiNardo et al. (1996) , Fortin and Lemieux (1998) , Donald et al. (2000) , Gosling et al. (2000) , Lemieux (2002) , Albrecht et al. (2003) , Ñopo (2004) , Gardeazabal and Ugidos (2005) , Machado and Mata (2005) , Melly (2005) .
Most of the more elaborate methods help addressing Dolton & Makepeace's critique of classic Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions that assessment of dierentials should consider comparisons of the whole distribution of wages for the two types of agents. The techniques typically involve estimating the wage distribution among the two types of agents, F f and F m , as well as a notional, counterfactual distribution F f|m that is the wage distribution among women that would be observed if their characteristics were rewarded as those of men, i.e., if men's conditional wage distributions applied to their characteristics,
3 In practice, wage regressions are often log-linear and ∆ OB 1 captures dierences in log wage. Estimating wage dierentials (not log-wage dierentials) from a log-linear specication involves the conditional variance of log wages since
2 ).
and therefore relies on stronger parametric assumptions about the (conditional) variance of log wages (σ s x ). See Blackburn (2007) .
Richer assessments of wage dierentials can then be made by looking at plots of probability distribution dierences between F f and F f|m (as in DiNardo et al., 1996 , Donald et al., 2000 , by considering the dierence at a number of distinct quantiles (as in Albrecht et al., 2003 ,Ñopo, 2004 , Gardeazabal and Ugidos, 2005 , Machado and Mata, 2005 , Melly, 2005 , and/or by computing indices capturing dierent aspects of distribution dierences such as inequality dierence, incidence of low pay, etc. (as in Dolton and Makepeace, 1985 , DiNardo et al., 1996 , Lemieux, 2002 . Methods vary in the way the distributions F f , F m , and F f|m are estimated but recently developed approaches impose few parametric assumptions, in contrast to the standard regression-based approach (and Dolton and Makepeace's (1985) technique). 4 Jenkins (1994) formulates a related, but dierent critique of the OaxacaBlinder approach. Jenkins (1994) is concerned with the aggregation of dierentials among women with heterogeneous characteristics. The dierence between the male and female wage distributions conditional on a given set of characteristics x is likely to vary substantially for dierent congurations of x. For example, dierentials between men and women may be lower for people with high human capital than for those with low human capital. Jenkins (1994) argues that disregarding this heterogeneity in measuring wage dierentials misses an important fact, both for a normative assessment of dierentials and for descriptive purposes. He challenges the argument that the amount of`discrimination' revealed in an average dierential of, say, 20 percent suered by all women uniformly (that is, regardless of their observable characteristics) is normatively equivalent to a conguration with, say, half women suering a dierential of 40 percent (those, e.g., with low human capital) and half women with pay equal to men's. Jenkins (1994) then develops methods allowing a richer assessment of this issue, as del R o et al. (2006) also do.
While Jenkins' (1994) critique and methods are directed at regression-based models focusing on dierences in mean wages, the critique holds more generally for the more elaborate distributive approaches based on comparisons of full (unconditional) wage distributions 
This averaging over Ξ is unaected by the distance between F m x and F f x for dierent x's and therefore does not take into account this source of heterogeneity. Whatever descriptive device or functional is then used to summarize δ 2 over a range of wages will not be informative about this heterogeneity, nor will it allow a normative appraisal that takes into account this heterogeneity as suggested by Jenkins (1994) .
The present paper suggests methods addressing that helps addressing both Dolton and Makepeace's (1985) and Jenkins' (1994) critiques. I pick up on the framework laid out in Jenkins (1994) and incorporate concerns for higher order dierences in the wage distributions of men and women, not just dierence in mean wages. Jenkins (1994) distinguishes the issues of identication, at the individual level, of the prejudice (in terms of wage) of being a woman rather than a man, and the aggregation in a scalar measure of`gender dierential' of these prejudices across the population of women. Generally speaking, identication involves calculating an individual level wage dierential based on the dierence between the wage distribution of men and women with given characteristics, that is
An expected utility-based framework
for a woman i with characteristics x i . In the Oaxaca-Blinder model, identication of discrimination against a woman i is based on dierences in expected log wages conditional on the observed characteristics of woman i, that is, in our notation
Modelling expected log wages as x i β s and aggregating using averages of d OB i over all women leads to the classic expected wage gap expression,
Jenkins (1994) focuses his critique on the aggregation procedure, but maintains d OB (x) as an indicator of the wage prejudice experienced by women with characteristics x. This paper challenges this latter approach. It is argued that the wage prejudice of being a woman rather than a man is not fully captured by comparing dierences in mean wages (conditional on x). Higher-order dierences, in particular, dierences in the spread of conditional wage distributions of men and women, as well as dierences in extreme quantiles are important when assessing the prejudice of women.
Let us take a utilitarian perspective. To start with, assume that a person's wage is a realization from a lottery with payo structure given by the (conditional) wage distribution for people having identical characteristics, F s x . As a basic principle, I consider that an agent of type f is prejudiced against if, given her characteristics, she would prefer to be paid a wage according to the other type's wage distribution. In other words, a woman is discriminated against if she would prefer her wage to be drawn from the men's lottery rather than by the women's lottery, given her characteristics.
Preferences over the whole pay-o structure are unlikely to be determined solely by dierences in expected outcome, and so, in this framework, dierence in mean wages conveys insucient information. Represent agents' preferences over lotteries by a utility functional U : Ω → R where Ω is the space of all possible wage distributions (a.k.a. lotteries). U(F) assigns a utility level to distribution F. The prejudice against a woman with characteristics x is then assessed by the dierence between U (F m x ) and U F f x . For some specications for U, women may be ready to trade lower expected wages for less uncertain outcomes. With extreme risk aversion, women might be concerned with the worst possible wages and thence compare only gender dierences in the probability of having low wages. Or alternatively, women might be concerned with the best possible wages and thence compare only gender dierences in the probability of having high wages. In all these circumstances, looking at dierences in expected wages is insucient to capture dierences between U (F m x ) and U F f x . In the absence of objectively veriable information about women's preferences over wage distributions, this paper does not attempt to elect any particular U function but rather constructs an array of summary measures incorporating different assumptions about U. To begin with, it is assumed that U as a standard expected utility form:
As explicitly written in Mas-Collel et al.'s (1995) classic textbook \The strength of the expected utility representation is that it preserves the very useful expectation form while making the utility of monetary lotteries sensitive not only to the mean but also to the higher moments of the distribution of the monetary payos" (Mas-Collel et al., 1995, p.184) . This is precisely what we are trying to capture. From this specication, two strategies are considered. The rst makes only limited additional assumptions about U and relies on rst-, second-, and third-order stochastic dominance criteria. The second proceeds with a specic specication for u.
Stochastic dominance criteria
It is well-known that rst-order stochastic dominance of the distribution function
implying U(F) U(G), for every non-decreasing function u (see, e.g., Hadar and Russell, 1969) . So, a woman with characteristics x would prefer being paid as a man whenever F m x rst-order stochastically dominates F f x if her preferences can be represented with an expected utility functional with non-decreasing u, reecting that they value receiving higher wages.
Similarly, second-order stochastic dominance of the distribution function F over G, that is w 0 F(s) w 0 G(s) for all w, leads to U(F) U(G) for every nondecreasing, concave function u (see, again, Hadar and Russell, 1969) . A woman with characteristics x would prefer being paid as a man whenever F m x secondorder stochastically dominates F f x if her preferences can be represented with an expected utility functional with nondecreasing, concave u, reecting that they value receiving higher wages but that the marginal value of an extra dollar is decreasing with the wage level.
Higher-order dominance is associated with comparisons of utility with additional restrictions on higher-order derivatives of u. For example, third-order stochastic dominance of F over G implies U(F) U(G) if u is nondecreasing (u (w) 0), concave (u (w) 0) and u (w) 0, so that the marginal value of an extra dollar is decreasing at an increasing rate with the wage level. 
Constant relative risk aversion
Stochastic dominance-based identication does not require many assumptions on the shape of the expected utility functional U. However it only allows ordinal comparisons { whether or not a woman prefers the men distribution. It does not allow one to tell`by how much.' In many applications, there is interest in being able to measure the degree of the dierential. To do so, one needs to specify fully the function u.
One such specication is u(w) = (1 − )w 1− if 0 and = 1 and u(w) = ln(w) if = 1. This implies constant relative risk aversion since wu (w)/u (w) = − . Multiplying all wages by a constant increases the overall utility U by the same constant. It is then convenient to re-express U in the`certainty equivalent' metric, that is, measure the utility associated with a distribution F by the value C(F) that, if received with certainty, would lead to the same utility as the uncertain outcome described by F. C(F) is dened implicitly as the solution of U(F) = U(F) whereF is a distribution with point-mass at the value C(F). With the chosen specication of u, the certainty equivalent is (Atkinson, 1970) . The parameter controls the degree of risk aversion. For = 0 there is no risk aversion; C(F; ) is equal to the expected wage. Increasing leads to C(F; ) < E(F): risk aversion makes people ready to trade lower expected wages against certainty, a.k.a. lower dispersion, in the wage distribution.
The second family of identication measures of wage dierentials is based on dierences in certainty equivalent wages between men and women:
; ).
Conditional quantile comparisons
A third, complementary strategy is not based on explicit utility functionals. Instead, in line with recent literature looking at unconditional quantile dierences, it looks at dierences at specic quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. Whereas the previous utility-based measures capture levels and higher-order differences in the whole wage distribution at once, quantile-based comparisons assume that women are concerned only with dierences at particular locations of distributions. This leads to individual-level dierential measures
where Q(F; θ) denotes the θ th quantile pf the distribution F. Of particular relevance are extreme quantiles. Extremely risk-averse women might be concerned with the \worst case" scenarii only and prefer the distribution with the highest lowest wage. This is a case for identifying dierentials by dierences at low conditional quantiles. Such a measure would be similar to thè certainty equivalent' indicator with −→ ∞. Conversely, one might think of people whose perception of dierentials is determined by the largest wages that one can get. Dierences at high quantiles then become relevant. This is particularly relevant to track`glass ceiling' eects (Albrecht et al., 2003 , Arulampalam et al., 2007 .
To sum up, as soon as one is willing to consider individual preferences over wage distributions in measuring wage dierentials, comparisons of expected wages reveal inadequate. The three families of δ F
indicators of individual-level prejudice provide solutions.
Aggregating individual-level differentials
Recall Jenkins's (1994) two steps of identication and aggregation. This paper concentrates on the former. Once one has identied individual-level dierentials, aggregate summary measures of wage dierentials are derived by combining them across women with heterogeneous characteristics, and therefore possibly dierent prejudices. The classic aggregation takes the average dierentials, that is
where d(x) is a particular indicator of the wage dierential for people with characteristics x. Jenkins (1994) , and subsequently del R o et al. (2006), propose alternative, normatively richer aggregation rules that can also be adopted. Additionally, graphical summaries of the distribution of dierentials can be reported. For the sake of simplicity only the naive`average' rule is adopted in the application.
3 Application: Gender differences in pay in Luxembourg
Context
Statec, the statistical oce of Luxembourg, recently reported that the average monthly gross wage is 20 percent lower for women than for men (e 3,939 for men against e 3,168 for women), and that half of this gap can be accounted for by dierences in human capital and job characteristics (STATEC, 2007) . The report also pointed out that unemployment risk is twice as high for women and that their participation rate is much lower (55 percent against 73 percent for the age group 15-64). These observations are similar to those found elsewhere in Europe despite peculiarities of the labour market in Luxembourg (e.g., high fraction of immigrant and cross-border workers, public/private sector segmentation, prevalence of banking industry and comparatively high wage rates).
Data
While key results in the Statec report are based on data from the Labour Force Survey, my analysis uses data from the Panel Socio-Economique Liewen zu L etzebuerg (PSELL-3/EU-SILC) despite the smaller sample size. The sample frame of the PSELL-3/EU-SILC is the whole population living in private households in Luxembourg, not only the working population. PSELL-3/EU-SILC therefore makes it possible to account for dierential selection in labour market participation between men and women.
PSELL-3/EU-SILC is a general prupose panel survey carried out annually since 2003 by CEPS/INSTEAD. More than 3,500 households residing in Luxembourg are surveyed and all adult members of sampled households are interviewed. The questionnaire covers topics such as income and living conditions employment, education, health.
To avoid results to be aected by gender dierences in pay near entry and exit in the labour market, I focus on individuals aged between 25 and 55. Given the substantial dierences in the earnings structure between the public and private sector, I also restrict attention to private sector wages. I focus on dierences in gross hourly wage computed as gross monthly salary in the current job (including paid overtime) divided by 4.32 times work hours in a normal week on the job. Respondents are characterized by a set of human capital variables: age and age squared, years of professional experience, education-level dummies (distinguishing general from technical/vocational training) and four nationality groups (Luxembourg nationals, Portuguese, other EU nationals, and non EU citizens). Finally, additional dummy variables describing dierent congurations of household structures (taking into the presence of children and other dependent members and the number of active adults) are used to predict labour market participation.
Estimation
The measures of wage dierential developed in this paper require estimation of conditional wage distributions can be used and inverted where necessary. Flexible estimators that avoid strong parametric assumptions on the shape of these functions are preferred. Several recently developed nonparametric or semi-parametric estimators can be chosen from; see estimators proposed in, inter alia, Fortin and Lemieux (1998) , Hall et al. (1999) , Pudney (1999) , Donald et al. (2000) , Peracchi (2002) .
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Another simple option is relying on classic linear quantile regression models estimated on a ne grid of points as in the techniques developed by Machado and Mata (2005) or Melly (2005) . Conditional quantiles are modelled as 6 Whereas an OLS estimate of regression coecients is the solution of minimizing a sum of squared residuals, (y i − x i β) 2 , β θ in a quantile regression model is the solution of minimizing a sum of (asymmetrically weighted) absolute residuals, ρ θ (y i − x i β θ ) (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978) . See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a non-technical survey of quantile regression methods.
regressions for a range of values for θ ∈ (0, 1) provides a exible estimate of the conditional quantile function Q j x i . One well-known problem with this approach is the`quantile crossing' problem. Because of the linearity constraint in the relationship between x and quantiles, it may happen that for some
despite θ < ϑ. This violates a logical monotonicity requirement for a quantile function {estimated conditional quantiles must be non-decreasing with θ. A useful device for dealing with this problem is the re-arrangement correction proposed by Chernozhukov et al. (2007) which involves rst estimating the quantile regression coecientsβ (θ) in increasing order separately for each conguration of x i . Chernozhukov et al. (2007) show that this procedure leads to consistent estimation of the conditional quantile functions satisfying monotonicity.
Besides parsimony and good computational properties, a key advantage of quantile regression is that sample selection correction can be incorporated using methods suggested in Buchinsky (1998). Buchinsky's (1998) selectivity-corrected quantile regressions involve estimating the quantile regression model augmented by a control function:
Introduction of the term h j θ (Ĝ j (w iγ j )) controls for selectivity bias. This terms is expected to be decreasing with the probability of participation (which is given byĜ j (w iγ j )). w i is a set of variables inuencing the probability of participation through the function G:
where z i = 1 if person i belongs to the sample of private sector workers and 0 otherwise.γ j are rst-stage estimates of γ in group j andĜ j is either a non-parametric rst-stage estimate of the function G for group j, or some parametrically specied function, such as the Gaussian cumulative probability function. h j θ does not have a known form and is therefore typically approximated by a series:
See Buchinsky (1998) or Albrecht et al. (2007) for details.
Sequences of selectivity-corrected quantile regressions for men and women separately have been estimated to construct the conditional quantile functions Q . For all sample observations I am therefore able to identify a wage distribution that, given her observed characteristics, would prevail if she were a woman or if she were a man.
Results
Measures of gender dierentials estimated from PSELL-3/EU-SILC are reported in Tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 reports results for measures based on stochastic dominance criteria. Table 2 Table 1 show the proportion of women for whom the man's wage distribution stochastically dominates the women distribution, at orders 1, 2 and 3. Proportions are also reported for specic population subgroups according to education level, age and nationality.
While 98 percent of women in our sample have an expected wage lower than in the equivalent male distribution (see supra), 28 percent can be considered`unambiguously' prejudiced even without assuming risk-aversion: their male-equivalent distribution rst-order dominates their conditional distribution. The proportion goes up to more than 40 percent for women with low education and middle-aged working women. Assuming risk-aversion leads to a dramatic increase in the number of women that can be considered unambiguously prejudiced: 72 percent of women have a wage distribution dominates by the equivalent male distribution at the second-order. Looking at higher order has little impact. Interestingly, at the second-order, the proportion of prejudiced women is the highest among women with high education (88 percent) rather than low education and dierences related to age disappear.
Constant relative risk aversion measures
Results for the second family of measures are reported in the rst three columns of Tables 2 and 3 . We assume now a particular evaluation function exhibiting constant relative risk aversion. Column labelled`EDE(0)' assume no risk aversion at all ( = 0). Columns labelled`EDE(1)'`EDE(2)' assume risk aversion with, respectively, = 1 and = 2. Table 2 reports proportions of women who would prefer being paid like a man given the evaluation functions selected. Table 3 reports the average dierences in the log of the evaluation functions to allow a cardinal assessment of the gap. So the rst column of Table 3 corresponds to the classic evaluation of the gender gap \at the mean." 98 percent of women would prefer to be paid like men according to the riskneutral evaluation function, that is the expected wage of women is lower than the equivalent male expected male for 98 percent of cases. Interestingly, the proportion even increases once risk-aversion is introduced. The wage gap evaluated \at the mean" is about 20 percent.
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As already indicated in Table 2 , introducing risk aversion increases the evaluation of the prejudice of women. For = 2, the gap increases to about 25 percent. This increase in the gap once risk is incorporated is observed in all population subgroups considered. The increase is particularly marked for women with high education and younger women.
Conditional quantile comparisons
Finally we can compare specic quantiles of the conditional distributions of men and women. The last two columns of Tables 2 and 3 report assessments based on the 10th and the 90th conditional percentiles. Table 2 show the proportion of women for whom the conditional percentiles are higher in the male equivalent distribution. Table 3 show the average dierence in the logarithm of the conditional percentiles.
This third set of measures reveal a particularly striking pattern: The gap is much larger at the 10th percentile than at the 90th percentile. Conditionally on human capital characteristics, there is much less dierence between men and women in the top wages than in the bottom wages. While the 10th percentile is lower than for men for all almost all women, the 90th percentile is lower for 62 percent of women only. Furthermore, well below half of high education women and younger women have a 90th percentile lower than for men. Similarly, while the average log dierence between men and women at the 10th conditional percentile is above 0.3, the dierence falls to 0.03 at the 90th conditional percentile. The average log dierence at the 90th conditional percentile is even negative for women with high education, for young women, and for Luxemburgish women.
These results are in sharp contrast with recent evidence of a glass ceiling in pay that has been reported in comparisons of unconditional wage distributions. Despite the apparent contradiction, both types of evidence are compatible because the gap at higher quantiles in the unconditional distribution is a complex combination of the gaps in the conditional distributions and the association between human capital and wages. In any case, this approach sheds new light on the glass ceiling hypothesis.
Summary and concluding remarks
This paper proposes a number of`generalized', statistical measures of wage dierentials that take into account higher-order dierences in conditional wage distributions rather than just mean dierences, as is typically done. The approach is distinct from recent papers that have compared unconditional wage distributions because the focus here is on conditional wage distributions {I assume that women evaluate their disadvantage by comparing themselves to observationally equivalent men (with respect to human capital characteristics), not to the overall population of men. This is a dierent perspective than recent examinations of the`glass ceiling' as in, e.g., Albrecht et al. (2003) or Arulampalam et al. (2007) because these studies focus on unconditional dierences. The nding that there is a larger gender gap at higher quantiles of the unconditional wage distribution is consistent with congurations of conditional wage gaps where women have higher penalty for lower (conditional) quantiles. Unconditional quantile dierences is the result of a combination of dierences in conditional distributions and the correlation between human capital characteristics and wages. As is well-known, there is no closed form relationship between the conditional and the unconditional quantiles (see, e.g., Firpo et al., 2007) .
The empirical results invalidate the hypothesis that lower wages for women are compensated by lower risk/uncertainty in pay (an hypothesis that might be advanced to explain the persistence of wage gaps in mean wages). Application to survey data for Luxembourg suggests that women are penalized twice: wages are lower on average and there is less certainty/more spread in their distribution. Results also indicate that this is driven by the bottom of the (conditional) distributions. Women (of any level of human capital) are at greater risk of receiving low wages than observationally equivalent men. Chances of receiving high wages are similar, given characteristics.
Results also suggest that taking self-selection into account is an important step (not accounting for it substantially underestimates wage dierentials). This paper paper is not meant to replace one identication of wage dierentials based on comparisons of expected wages with another allegedly superior measure based on some alternative concept, but rather to propose a series of complementary measures that oer a richer overall appraisal of wage dierentials, allow normatively robust assessments, and help identifying ne structures of gender wage dierentials.
